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The proposition that late medieval English lawgivers believed
themselves to be exercising a declarative function has been so frequently put forward and so widely accepted that it is in danger of
being canonized by sheer dint of repetition; 1 and thus one who
would deny the essential validity of that notion bears the virtually
insuperable burden of proof commonly accorded an accused heretic.
Nevertheless, it will be argued here that natural law notions are
attributed to the medieval English legislator with only the slightest
support from the sources, and after only the most rudimentary and
uncritical analyses of the implications of such an idea. One possible
source of confusion lies in the use of the term "natural law" in at
least two distinct fashions. For some, the notion is embodied in the
principle that all legislation is declaratory of pre-existing rights; 2
that
for others, the central idea of natural law is the proposition
3
some matters are beyond the reach of legislative authority. It will
not be possible here to deal with all the various statements of the
argument or its refinements,4 but I hope to sketch in outline my
reasons for believing the declaratory theory to be generally misconceived and offer some admittedly tentative conclusions.
I.
The central difficulty faced in an investigation of the legitimacy of the declaratory theory is knowing what medieval English* This Article is based on a paper delivered to the American Society for Legal
History at Chicago in November, 1974.
f Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.S.E.E. 1965, LL.B. 1968,
University of Arkansas; LL.M. 1969, SJ.D. 1971, Harvard University. Member,
Arkansas bar.
1 See F. KERN, KINGSHIP AND LAw IN THE MIDDLE AcES (S. Chrimes trans.

1939). Ker's declaration is the most common statement of the proposition under
criticism here. It has been often, and recently, repeated. See, e.g., M. Hoawrz,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERCAN LAw, 1780-1860, at 16-17 (1977).
2 F. KERN, supra note 1, at 156-66.
3 E.g., C. McILwAiN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT 99 (1910).
4 For a useful survey of the controversy, see J. GOUGH, F ,AMENTAL LAw IN
ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 12-29 (1955).
(329)

330

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 126:329

men were thinking; and unless they tell us directly, we can know
their thinking only by examining their deeds. Of the numerous law
books written in the thirteenth century, 5 not one contains a statement indicating an awareness of a declaratory theory of parliamentary enactments. Bracton concerns himself not with whether
the law can be changed, but rather with who can change it.6 It is
true, of course, that most thirteenth-century lawbooks dealt principally with procedural matters and that, for all the modern commentary on Bracton's public law passages, 7 only a tiny fraction of
the De Legibus is devoted to constitutional matters. Still, if natural
law theories of legislation had any currency at all in England, it
seems odd that Bracton, the extent of whose Romanesque learning
is only now becoming apparent," has nothing to say about them.
He can hardly have been unaware of the controversy over natural
law notions which consumed much of the time of contemporary
divines, canonists, and legists. 9 A medieval commentator on Bracton
has put it well: "[1n Anglia minus curatur de iure naturali quam
in aliqua regione de mundo . . . ." 1 (In England less attention is
paid to natural law than in any other part of the world.)
While the silence of Bracton and of other thirteenth-century
treatise writers is suspicious, it is admittedly inconclusive. Direct
evidence having failed, resort must be had to legislative practice in
order to discover the medieval English attitude toward enacted law.
5 There are more of these books than is generally realized. See Hazeltine,
DE HENG-AM SuMrMAE (W. Dunham ed. 1932); Woodbine,
Introduction to Fous THARTEENTH CENTURY LAw TRAc-rs 1-4 (1910) (containing

Preface to RADuLPrm

only a partial list of thirteenth-century treatises on law).
62 BRA ToN, ON' Tin LAWs AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (DE
*55 (S. Thorne trans. 1968 at 21, 169).

LzGmus)

*1,

Following Justinian (or Azo), Bracton

makes the mandatory allusions to natural law. Id. 03b-4 (S. Thorne trans. 1968 at
26). Nowhere, however, does he speak of the duty of legislation to conform to the
dictates of natural law, nor does he attempt to define its content. Moreover, he
speaks of the right to self defense as part of the jus gentium. Id. *4 (S. Thome

trans. 1968 at 27). He differentiates between natural law and the jus gentium and
furthermore states that civil or municipal law may contradict the jus gentium. In
contrast to Bracton's discussion of natural law, there is some very sophisticated

analysis by his contemporaries on the Continent about the duty of legislation to
conform to natural law, and about what happens when there is a conflict. See
A. D'ENrn.vES, NATURAL LAw 37-50 (2d ed. 1970). See also text accompanying
notes 67-70 infra.

7 See, e.g., Schulz, Bracton on Kingship, 60 ENG. HisT. Rlv. 136 (1945).
8 See Thorne, Introduction to 1 BRACTON, O,4 TiE LAws AND Cousroms OF
ENGLAND oxxii-xl (S. Thorne trans. 1968).

9 See A. D'ENTrnvEs, supra note 6, at 37-50.
10

8
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SOCIETY,

SELECT

PASSAGES

Fsom

TE WoRKs OF BRAcTON AND

Azo 125 (F. Maitland ed. 1895) (Maitland describes this commentary as a marginal

gloss on Bracton's work taken from a Cambridge manuscript that "seem[s] to [have]

come from a man who was at work in the last years of Edward I. and the first of
Edward II." Id. 123).
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II.
That English law "changed" in one sense or another over the
course of the middle ages is a proposition that none, of course, would
dispute.11 More importantly, it is equally clear that conscious breaks
with the past were regular features of English legislation from the
earliest times. A few examples will make this clear.
Circa 890, King Alfred, while admitting that he had consulted
the laws of his predecessors in promulgating his own, stated that
"[M]any of those I did not approve of I have annulled ....

.

1.2

His criterion for selection was the "justness" of the laws examined:
"[T]hose which were the most just of the laws I found . . . these I

have collected while rejecting the others." -1 Moreover, Alfred did
not claim his laws were any more permanent than those which preceded them, for he added that, "I cannot tell what [innovations of
mine] will meet with the approval of our successors." 14 There are
other examples of admitted departures from past legal norms during
the Anglo-Saxon period, 15 but these words of Alfred furnish the
clearest and most self-conscious evidence of deliberate change
through legislation.
Nevertheless, it remains true that English kings and their advisers usually exhibited a remarkable conservatism. The most
hackneyed example of resistance to change is the famous dictum of
the Barons at Merton when met with the question of the legitimating force, if any, of a subsequent marriage. One version of that
dictum is "nolumus leges Angliae mutare quae usitate sunt et approbatae." 16 That is, "We would not change the laws of England
which are customary and approved," or, more forcefully perhaps,
"We do not wish to change the laws of England which are customary
and approved." It seems quite significant that they did not reject
the canonists' notion of post-marriage legitimation with a shrug and
a non possumus; it is not their inability to effect a change in the
11 For an assessment of the changes wrought by Edward I, see T.
EDWAnD I AND CRIMINAL LAw

(1960); T. PLucKuETr,

PLucKNr,

LEGisLATioN- OF EDWAuD

I

(1949).

12 THE LAws OF THE EAIU.Isr ENGLISHIKINGS 63 (F. Attenborough ed. 1922).
13 Id.

14Id.

15 See, e.g., id. 19 (the preamble to the decrees of Hlothhere and Eadric, Kings
of Kent, describes those decrees as extensions of the laws of their predecessors);
id. 25 (the preamble to the decrees of Wihtred, King of Kent, describes the decrees
as additions to the legal usages of the people of Kent).
16 Maitland, Introduction to 1 BRAcroN's NomnBooK 115 (3d ed. 1887). See
also id. 104-17 (discussing the three extant versions of the phrase).
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law that makes them reluctant, but a dislike for the substance of the
17
change-and for its source.
That legislative changes were not uncommon in the thirteenth
century is evident from the most cursory examination of the statute
book. The legislation of Edward I is the most fruitful for this
purpose, though precedents from the reign of Henry III are not
wanting. Innovative and intentional law-giving is a most obvious
feature of the statute De Donis, 8 which specifically states that the
previous condition of the law is the mischief to be undone.19 The
familiar effects of the statute are worth mentioning here: the donee
in fee tail lost his right to alienate and a remedy was given the heir.
In effect, the statute converted a fee simple into a life estate, and
what was at best a mere expectancy into something like a vested
remainder in fee-what kind of fee would be the subject of more
debate in the following century.20 This was a legislative feat worthy
of the most powerful sovereign in the most sovereign of ages.
Another obvious example of what seems to have been intentional and innovative lawgiving is the statute of Quia Emptores.2 '
By this statute the former practice of subinfeudation was forbidden,
it being provided that
[F]rom henceforth it shall be lawful to every Freeman
to sell at his own pleasure his Lands and Tenements, or
Part of them; so that the Feoffee shall hold the same Lands
or Tenements of the [Chief Lord of the same Fee, by such
22
Service] and Customs as his Feoffor held before.
The possibility of successfully arguing that this statute was merely
declaratory is remote. The field of criminal law provides other
examples, such as the creation of seemingly new misdemeanors during Edward I's reign. For instance, the Statute of Westminister II
made it illegal to fish for salmon at certain times. 23

Finally, the

Statute of London contains a large number of what now might be
17 1 F. PoxaTocK & F. MAm.Luw, Tim HISToRY OF ENGLISH LAw 188-89 (2d
ed. 1968).
18 Statute of Westminster II, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, preamble & c. 1, reprinted in
1 STATuTEs OF TnE REim 71 (1810).
19 Id.
20
See T. PxucxNETr, A CONCISE HiSTORY OF THE COmrON LAw 551-57 (5th
ed. 1956).
21 Statute Quia Emptores Terrarum, 1290, 18 Edw. 1, reprinted in 1 STATUTES
OF THE REALM 106 (1810).

221d.

23 Statute of Westminister II, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 47, reprinted in 1 STATUTES
REAs 94 (1810).
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referred to as municipal regulations. Examples include new rules
prohibiting the teaching of fencing 24 and outlining the qualifica25
tions of those seeking to be hostelers and innkeepers.
It is true that much of Edward's legislation was said to be
aimed at merely providing a remedy. De Donis, for instance, specifically stated that the King granted the statute because he "perceiv[ed] how necessary and expedient it should be to provide
Remedy in the aforesaid Cases." 26
It is also true that abrupt beginnings are very rare in English
legal history. For example, subinfeudation was forbidden by local
custom in some regions even before QuiaEmptores; 27 and De Donis
was anticipated by the availability of the writ of Formedon in very
select circumstances before the passage of the statute.2 8 Nevertheless, as Professor Milsom has pointed out, "The statute was not
declaratory." 29 It is clear, furthermore, that an entry by an heir in
fee tail on an alienee would not have been regarded as permissible
before the statute.30 Much of Edward's other legislation was intended to provide legal redress where the law had previously supplied none. Chapter 50 of Westminster II notes that some, but not
all, of its sections were aimed at eliminating instances "where the
Law faileth
.
lest Suitors coming to the King's Court should
This concern with
depart from thence without Remedy." 31
remedies, however, does not necessarily mean that the legislators'
minds were fixed against innovation; in this case it may mean just
the opposite-that a new direction must be taken. The realization
that a statute created an entirely new and different substantive legal
relation finds expression in the common assertion that it is to apply
"from henceforth," and in explicit prohibitions against retroactivity.3 2 As Chief Justice Berreford stated in 1305, in a case in24

Statutes for the City of London, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, 13, reprinted in 1

Fm
STATUTEs oF
25 Id. ff 6.

B-x iAL103 (1810).
The existence of purely regulatory laws like these are very difflcult

to explain on natural law grounds. It is hard to see them as other than positive
enactments intended to accomplish municipal policies not easily located in natural
]aw.
26 Statute of Westminister H, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, preamble, reprinted in 1
STATUTES OF T=E Exm 71 (1810).
2
7 See T. LXucmNmr, LEcisLA EON Or EDwA
I 5 (1949).
28
Milsom, Formedon Before De Donis, 72 LAw Q. Rlv. 391 (1956).

29 Id. 393.
30 See 2 BRAcroN, supra note 6, at *1Tb (S. Thorne trans. 1968 at 67).
31 Statute of Westminster I, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 50, reprinted in 1 STATUTEs
oF m lAr..Nx 95 (1810).
3
2 The Statute of Westminster II provides: "All the said Statutes shall take
Effect at the Feast of St. Michael next coming, so that by occasion of any Offence
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volving what today's judges would call problems of fair warning,
"At common law no one knew the law which would be for the
future." 3
III.
If, as it is asserted here, there was so much self-conscious innovation in the legislation of the late thirteenth-century, if Edward
and his legal advisors had evidently set out to change much that had
been clear law before, if the contemporary chronicles record that
the King at Westminster had "established very many new laws," 34
how did it happen that the declaratory theory of parliamentary
activity has remained so popular in the academic mind? How did
it come to pass, as Plucknett puts it, that this paradox has been so
long and so brilliantly sustained? 5
First, a caveat advanced before may be usefully repeated herethe thing to be determined is how medieval Englishmen who concerned themselves with such matters conceived of the job Parliament
was doing, and not the job itself. Even a society which clings devotedly to a natural law theory of parliamentary activity can effect
the most fundamental changes by claiming that every change accomplishes no more than a return to more pristine, and therefore
more correct, beginnings. In other words, the common law could
be said to have strayed from the true path and a statute was therefore required to set it right. Alternatively, it might be argued that
natural law had never been embodied in previous custom or statute,
and that it is only through the new enactment that natural right
is vindicated. So all of Edward's innovations, and indeed those of
the Anglo-Saxon kings, can be explained away in this fashion. 36
By relying on such reasoning, even the provisions against retroactivity in Edward's statutes can be explained: a person ought not
to suffer because he has relied justifiably on a previous, though
erroneous, state of the "law." Such provisions, the argument would
done on this side the said Feast, contrary to any of these Statutes, no Punishment
... shall be executed upon the Offenders."

Id.

On the retroactivity of medieval

English statutes generally, see T. PLUCKNETr, STATUTES AND TBEm INTERpRETATION
IN TBE FmsT HALF OF TrE FoURTEENTH CENTRmY 113-120 (1922).
33 Rote v. Benet de C., Y.B. Pasch. 32 & 33 Edw. 1, 480 (1305)
SEaiEs) (author's translation).

(RoLLs

34

F. POwIcxE, THE THmTEENzTH CENTURY 369 (2d ed. 1962) (quoting the
Norwich chronicler); see id. 368-80.
35 T.PIucErT, supra note 27, at 6 n.1.
36 The fact that Alfred, see text accompanying note 12 supra, in picking among
his predecessors' laws employed the criterion of "justness" arguably indicates that he

thought it was their "just" character, and not his will, that gave them legitimacy.
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run, merely prevent forfeitures which would otherwise befall innocent people. In other words, a defense of reasonable mistake of
law is embodied in the statute. The statute De Donis, for example,
is made prospective in its application not because it was not always
the law, but because a retroactive application would be unfair and
amount to a form of official entrapment. Therefore, even the most
striking innovations of medieval parliaments can be made to look
like what modern lawyers would call "prospective overruling."
To repeat, such arguments could be advanced to defend the
declaratory theory of statutory enactments, and some of these ideas
have in fact been employed. Most, however, have not, and for
good reason. The notions outlined above are rather sophisticated,
and while it ought not be doubted that Edward and his advisers
were intellectually capable of entertaining them, it is not easy to
believe that they did so without leaving a trace in the literature.
The only alternative to this contorted analysis, it is submitted, is to
abandon the theory of a declaratory Parliament entirely, and substitute for it an assembly bent on preservation, not because it was
in some sense necessary or inevitable, but because it was desirable.
Advocates of a contrary view may still argue, nonetheless, that
members of Parliament saw their actions as those of a court, declaring the law, rather than a legislature, capable of creating and
changing it. Upon close analysis it appears that that argument,
too, is based on misperceptions.
IV.
The fact that Parliament was a court, even primarily a court,
has led some to believe, and to say, that it was only a court and that
its members saw little or no difference between adjudication and
legislation.3 7 Such opinions find apparent support from the occasional assertions in the Year Books that acts of parliament are judgments- 8 These assertions have been seized upon as proof that
natural law theory lay behind all parliamentary activity-that, in
other words, statutes and judgments were regarded as identical.
Even the most cursory examination of the cited cases is sufficient
to establish that this claim is erroneous. In none of them is it
stated that a statute is a judgment; only an act, or some acts, are
37 See Barraclough, Law and Legislation in Medieval England, 56 LAW Q. REv.
75, 76-83 (1940); of. Thorne, Introduction to A DiscouRsE UPoN TnE ExposIcIoN
AND UNDERSTANDING OF STATuTEs 9-10, n.9 (S. Thorne ed. 1942) (stating that
"statutes [were not] regarded as quite different from the judgments, records, and
fines customary [in Parliament]").
38 See, e.g., those cases cited in note 39 infra.
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said to be judgments.3 9 The word "act" is not used to describe a
parliamentary product until the late 14th century, and then only
rarely. When it appears, it is employed in a quite vague and general
fashion, much the same way as it is used in the "Acts of the Apostles"
or the "Acts of the Privy Council." "Acts" in these instances simply
means a narrative of things said and done. This definition has
absolutely nothing in common with the word's modern connotation
of a product of legislative effort. 40 Over the course of time the meaning of the term came to include statutes, and there are a few, rare
41
examples of its employment in this fashion in the fifteenth century.
For the most part, however, it is reserved for describing activity
other than general legislation. Rather, "act" is most often used to
describe either the outcome of petitions filed by individuals, or filed
on their behalf, against other individuals with a view to adjusting
the parties' private rights, or grants made by the King to certain
individuals at their urging. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
results of such petitions should be regarded as mere judgments.
An example will make this clear. In the third year of the reign
of Edward IV, Robert Woodlark (the Year Book calls him "Wodlac"), the Principal of what later became St. Catharine's College,
Cambridge, was sued by the Warden of Merton College, Oxford,
for wrongful entry and detainer.42 The property in dispute included
Merton Hall in Cambridge. Woodlark pleaded in bar an Act of
Parliament (actually letters patent of the King issued with the advice
and consent of Parliament) granting the lands in question to his
predecessor; and on this plea a demurrer was joined.
Littleton, arguing for the plaintiff, claimed the bar was insufficient, first of all, because it failed to give the plaintiff "color" of
tide-that is, it failed to show how the plaintiff was claiming the
land and why the claim was bad. (In this period, most lawyers
thought it was necessary for all pleas in bar in trespass cases where
the title of land was in question to anticipate the plaintiff's claim
in this fashion.) Furthermore, he said, even if color had been
39In re Annuite, Y.B. Hill. 21 Hen. 7, f. 1, pl. 1 (1505); Provost & Escholiers
de Camb. v. Vicair de Camb., Y.B. Trin. 7 Hen. 7, f. 14, 15, pl. 1 (1491); Sewer
v. Wodlac, Y.B. Trin. 3 Edw. 4, f. 1, 2, pl. 1 (1463) (acts of Parliament declared
"the highest record [i.e., judgment] that there is in law"); Chedder v. Broke, Y.B.
Mich. 8 Hen. 4, f. 12, 13, pl. 13 (1406) (ordinance of Parliament pertaining to
a particular assault and battery said to be a "judgment").
40
See generally H. GRAY, THE INFLUENCE OF THE COMMONS ON ER.LY
LEGISLATioN 387-404 (1932).
41 For an early example, see Chedder v. Broke, Y.B. Mich. 8 Hen. 4, f. 12, 13,

p1. 1342 (1406).

Sewer v. Wodlac, Y.B. Trin. 3 Edw. 4, f. 1, p1. 1 (1463).
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given, it might be that some events had occurred after the Act which
would have tolled the defendant's entry, and such events ought to
be presumed to have occurred unless the defendant shows the
43
contrary.
The defendant replied that color was unnecessary in this case
and the Act itself was a sufficient bar; for the plaintiff was "a party
and privy to the record [judgment] and it will bind him as much as
if we had pleaded a recovery [in a court of law] of the same land...
against the plaintiff or his predecessor by the defendant or his
predecessor .

.

.

." 4

The plaintiff is bound by this judgment, "is

party and privy to this record," because "everyone is privy to an
Act of Parliament." 4 So, Woodlark's argument continued, the
plea is prima facie sufficient unless the plaintiff could show some
title accruing after the Act which would bar the defendant's right or
toll his entry.4 6 This argument is simply that the judgments of
parliament in these kinds of land cases are, to use modem
terminology, in rem, and thus conclusive against everyone. The
judgment was the "highest record" known to the law and determined title, not just between certain litigants and their privies in
the usual sense, but in the abstract. Only one judge of the four
whose opinions are noted was inclined to give this argument any
force, and he merely thought the Act raised a presumption that
nothing had occurred subsequent to it to bar the defendant's claim
or action 4 7 It would be up to the plaintiff to show by way of rejoinder if that were true.
Littleton was to have the better of the argument, however, and
proceeded to demolish the defendant's position. He simply accepted the view that he, like everyone, was privy to this judgment,
but argued that once it, like any other judgment, had been executed,
it lost its force; and since the defendant's predecessor had been
seised by virtue of it, it was no longer of practical effect. He
analogized the Act to a recovery against his grandfather in an ordinary law court which had been executed against his grandfather; its
bar would extend to him only if it appeared that he was claiming
by inheritance from his grandfather. Because nothing of that sort
was alleged in the plea in bar he argued that his action ought not to
46
be concluded.
43

Id. at f. 2.

44 Id.

(author's translation).

45 Id.
46Id.

(author's translation).

47Id. at f. 5 (Ardern, J.).
48 Id. at f. 2.
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Although there was no decision on the demurrer, it is abundantly clear from the discussion that followed that Littleton had
won the court over to his characterization of the Act. Indeed, all
Littleton had done was to accept his opponent's characterization of
the Act and turn it against him. He had done this brilliantly, showing a quickness in the midst of a very technical difficulty which was
remarkable. But the perimeters within which the discussion took
place were unremarkable and ordinary. What had lain behind the
Act pleaded in bar was a dispute between two Royal Colleges. After
that dispute was settled in Parliament all titles previous to the Act
were barred, that is, the judgment was in rem. (The in rem effect
of the Act may actually amount to no more than a restatement of
the rule that one may not inquire into the validity of Royal grants.)
Subsequent titles, however, were not barred because all the Act
accomplished was to quiet title in the winning party in the abstract
sense. It was, in other words, a private Act aimed at adjusting
private rights, and was no more a statute in the usual sense than a
nineteenth-century Act granting a divorce. There is nothing
extraordinary in this, and no suggestion whatsoever is made that a
statute of general effect and prospective applicability was in any
way similar to a judgment. Viewed in this light, Littleton's statement that "if an Act of Parliment be once executed it will not again
be put in execution," 49 otherwise incomprehensible, becomes intelligible. Obviously a statute would be "put in execution" until
it was repealed. Indeed, the word "statute" is never employed in
the argument, and this omission is not likely to have been accidental.
The proposition that the difference between statutes and judgments was much more than dimly perceived finds further support in
the 1399 Parliament Rolls of Henry IV.50 In the Parliament held
that year the commons presented an unusual petition which they
prefaced, as the rolls are careful to note, with a request for freedom
of speech, although the general grant of that liberty had already
been made. 51 The substance of the petition was this: that "since
judgments of the parliament belong solely to the King and the
Lords, and not to the commons . . ." the commons therefore prays
"that no record be made in Parliament against the said commons to
the effect that they are or will be parties to any judgments given or
49 Id. at f. 7 (author's translation).
50 3 RoTuiff P~uL aim'roanum 427 (circa 1783).

51 The original prayer for the liberty of free speech is recorded in 3
PARroRum, supra note 50, at 424.
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-to be given thereafter in Parliament." 52 The King answered,
through the Archbishop of Canterbury, that the commoners are
mere petitioners and plaintiffs and that the King and the Lords have
the right of giving judgment. But, the Archbishop says, "with regard to making statutes, grants and subsidies, or such similar things
to be made for the common profit of the Realm, the King wishes to
have their advice and consent." r1 In other words, judgments were
to be rendered by the King and the Lords, those learned in the
law; but the enactment of statutes, laws applicable to everyone,
required the consent of the commons.
Statutes and judgments were not only regarded as different in
terms of who had the power to promulgate them; they were also
viewed as having different effects. The so-called "statute" of
William Butler 54 presents a very interesting example. In 1291
Butler brought a writ of waste complaining of acts done in his
ancestor's time, and an objection was taken that there was no cause
of action in anyone but the ancestor. The Justices disagreed on the
questions presented, and the matter was referred to Parliament.
There the dispute was settled in favor of Butler, and it was ordained
that this result be "from henceforth . . . strictly observed." r In
1315 the effect of this parliamentary act was questioned, and Chief
Justice Berreford refused to regard it as a statute, probably because
it was not sealed. 56 Viewed as a judgment he held that it was entitled to no weight because it was wrongly decided. He explained:
It was once said by Sir Henry of Bracton that non exemplis
set racionibusadjudicandum est [one ought to decide cases
you
in accordance with reason not precedents]; and what
57
allege to be a statute never had statutory authority.
In other words, if this parliamentary proceeding had resulted in an
effective statute, it would have been followed in subsequent cases.
As it was not a statute, however, it could only be a judgment, and
there being no doctrine of stare decisis, the court was free to ignore
this judgment because it had been erroneously rendered. In the
absence of a statute, right reason determined the outcome of a case,
521d. 427 (author's translation).
l3d. (author's translation).
54 Statute of Waste, 1291-92, 20 Edw. 1, reprinted in 1
BIREA.M 109 (1810).

STATUTES OF THm

515
Id. 110 (author's translation).
56 Cayley v. Tattershall, Y.B. Pasch. 8 Edw. 2, f. 273 (1315), reported in 41
SELEN SociLrz 116 (1924).
57 Id. at 118 (author's translation).
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not precedent. A statute had a future effect; a judgment, even one
rendered by Parliament, did not.
V.
If, as it has been argued here, the occasional equation of acts of
Parliament with judgments is not so remarkable as it might at first
seem, the proponents of the natural law theory of Parliamentary
activity are left virtually without evidence to support their thesis.
There is, however, one early fourteenth-century case which may be
interpreted to support that idea, 58 although it has never before been
marshalled for such a purpose. It seems appropriate to consider
it here.
In Aumeye v. Abbat, decided in 1305, the great Chief Justice
Ralph de Hengham suggested that the Statute of Marlborough,5 9
enacted in 1267, should prevail over the Statute of Westminster II,
enacted eighteen years later. 60 "One often sees," said Hengham,
"one statute undo another." 61 This dictum earned for Hengham
the amused condescension of a later generation of commentators 62_
how could he have been so foolish as to think that an earlier statute
could repeal a later one? Yet it is possible that Hengham had hold
of a thought that has escaped the commentators. Hengham, in 1307,
was seventy years old, or thereabouts, 63 and his dictum may reflect
the confusion which an earlier and more primative legal tradition
felt when confronted by two conflicting statutes: if statutes are
merely authoritative declarations of what the law "is," and therefore
"always has been," how does one reconcile two obviously irreconcilable propositions? 64 Of course, even the most devoted disciple of
the natural law theory need not reach Hengham's conclusion, for
one could attribute to parliament the sole and exclusive power of
declaration, and could reason just as easily that the latter declaration
should prevail over the former. This is only one way out of the
58 Aumeye

v. Abbat, Y.B. Mich. 33 Edw. 1, 79 (1305) (RoLLS SERIEs).
59 Statute of Marlborough, 1267, 52 Hen. 3, c. 9, reprinted in I STATUTEs oF
THE REAIm 21-22 (1810).
60 Statute of Westminster II, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 2, reprinted in 1 STATUTEs OF
THE REALm 72-73 (1810).
61
Aumeye v. Abbat, Y.B. Mich. 33 Edw. 1, 79, 83 (1305) (ROLLs SERLES)
(author's translation).
62 See T. PLCKNETT, supra note 27, at 73.
63 See Dunham, Biographical Preface to RADULPHm DE HENcau. SUMM",
supra64note 5, at xlv-xlvi.
For a discussion of the implications of the declaratory theory of legislation,
see P. STEn, REcurA Iums 19-25 (1966).
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dilemma, however, and is not at all a necessary corollary to the
declaratory theory.
Whatever Hengham's thought may have been, if any, it is clear
that it was not shared by his contemporaries. When Richard II was
deposed later in the century, one of the complaints against him was
that he had ignored the principle that statutes were binding "donec
auctoritate alicuius alterius Parliamenti fuerint specialiter revocata" 15 (until they are specifically revoked by the authority of some
other Parliament). Clearly, then, statutes were not regarded as
simply declaratory in the fourteenth century, and Hengham's
dictum, whatever it may have meant, commanded no respect. Indeed, Geoffrey Scrope, arguing in a case five years later, was astonished by it.6

VI.
Turning momentarily from consideration of natural law in
medieval England to an examination of contemporary literature
produced by continental writers, the contrast is quite striking. The
writings of canonists and divines will be ignored in order to avoid
criticisms of irrelevance and assertions that their writings were
purely theoretical and without practical secular effect. Consider
instead the famous legist Baldus. In his commentary on DIGEST
1.1.3, de lustitia et lure, Baldus discussed the right to self defense,
and put the case of a statute which makes it lawful to kill an outlaw. 67 Would such a statute make it unlawful for the outlaw to
defend himself? Baldus concluded that it would, as a matter of
statutory construction, and then went on to consider whether such a
statute would be void as an interference with natural law. He stated
that the right to defend oneself is part of the natural law and that
"natural law cannot be abridged by statute." 68 On the other hand,
Baldus noted that although "natural law cannot be abrogated" by
statute, some felt that it could be "covered up," or "veiled" as he put
it, for so long as the statute endures. Recognizing a difference of
opinion among commentators on this issue, Baldus indicated that
proponents of the "statutory veil" theory would, in the example
under consideration, support their view by resort to the principle
that one may not resist a person who acts under authority of law. 69
supra note 50, at 419.
Hauterive v. Painel, Y.B. Mich. 4 Edw. 2 (1310), reported in 22 SIMDEN

65 3 RoTui.w PAuL.%NmNTORU,
66

SocIEY 56, 57-58 (1907).
67 1 B. UBALDI, OPRA OAmI- 10 (1707).
68 Id.
69 Id.
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Discussions of this sort are simply absent from English law
books.70 It seems probable that the concepts employed were absent
as well from the minds of medieval English lawyers. In the sixteenth century, when lawyers began to have closer ties with the
universities and, therefore, with the learned laws, natural law ideas
began to appear in their treatises. As a result, Christopher St.
Germain and John Perkins were able to produce books so superior
to Littleton's that comparison is painful.7 1 Does it not seem preferable to place the advent of natural law theories in England in the
sixteenth century, when unusual social and economic pressures
caused a parliament and a king to interfere in an almost unprece72
dented fashion with long-standing common law arrangements?
VII.
In the England of the middle ages, there is no indication that
legislation was thought of as having to conform to any particular
standard. It is true that, with the exception of Edward I's reign,
there were very few changes wrought in the substantive law during
the period. The criminal law, the law of contracts and torts, and
to a lesser degree the law of property, remained virtually untouched
by legislative intervention. But it seems foolish to attribute that
fact to a necessity to conform to some external standard, when such
an explanation is at odds with the evidence, and when to adhere to
it requires contorted analyses. There are alternative explanations
for the relatively static nature of medieval law which are more
readily supported, and which do not require the imputation of a
legal sophistication to the medieval English mind that it almost
surely did not have. The most plausible of those alternatives is to
attribute the observed changelessness to conservatism, and to see the
reluctance to legislate as a reflection, not of a perceived inability,
but of a simple lack of desire.
Most medieval obligations derived their force from longstanding common law arrangements and not from statutory authority,
7
0 Bracton, for example, never asserted that legislation must conform to natural
law. As a result, he never concerned himself with what should be done if a conflict
arose. See note 6 supra.
71 Compare J. PERKINS, A PRosrr=ABr BooK (1528) (Greening trans. 1827);
91 SELDEN SOC' Y, ST. GERmAN's DocroR AN Stunmr (1523) (T. Plucknett &
J. Barton eds. 1974) with T. Lrrr.uToN, TmREs (1481) (Tomlins ed. 1841).
72
Circa 1465, Sir John Fortescue wrote a book suggestively entitled De Natura
Legis Naturae (On the Nature of the Law of Nature). This volume, however, was
concerned with a narrow political question (the succession to the English throne),
was not circulated during the fifteenth century, and was not even printed until 1869.
It is clear that Fortescue's book had no impact on English legal thought. See
Fortescue, On the Nature of the Law of Nature, in Sm JoiN FonTscUE, KmcT,
His LNE, Woncs, Asn F ,sm HIsToRY (T. Fortescue, ed. 1869).
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but this is more easily seen as the product of satisfaction on the part
of the classes with real political influence than as the result of disablement. There are some very rare references in Parliamentary
discussions to the "law of the land" in a way that makes it clear
that something like fundamental law is meant. However, it is clear
that these references were made in the context of Parliament's adjudicatory function, and have to do with procedural due process
rights (like a defendant's right to be notified with some precision of
a plaintiff's claim) which no one would think of trying to alter by
legislation in any event.7

3

The resort to ordinary ideas of fairness

in settling disputes between individuals in a court room is unremarkable, indeed it was almost surely a regular feature of medieval
jury trial. The fund of shared assumptions on which medieval
jurors could draw to decide cases, a kind of natural law, was what
made that trial system workable.7 4 But the existence of these shared
assumptions sheds no light upon the medieval perception of the
nature of those few substantive statutes that were in fact passed; nor
is it right to derive from the presence of this common fund a resistance to change attributable to any higher ideal than a mere desire
to keep things as they were. The point made here is so far mainly
destructive, but it seems an improvement over the continued acceptance of a theory whose supporting evidence is embarrassingly
absent.
73
See, e.g., Goldington v. Bassingburn, Y.B. Trin. 3 Edw. 2, f. 81 (1310),
reported in 20 Smir-m SocETY 194, 196 (1905) (Berreford, CJ., relating such an

instance from the reign of Edward I).
74See generally Arnold, Law and Fact in the Medieval Jury Trial: Out of Sight,
Out of Mind, 18 A. J. LEc.L HisT. 267 (1974).

